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Australia's energy transition has an identity security problem

Australia's energy transition has an identity security problem

Wed, 18th Nov 2026 (Today)
Geoff Schomburgk
GEOFF SCHOMBURGK Vice President, Asia Pacific & Japan Yubico

Australia's energy transition is reshaping more than just the generation mix. As coal-fired power stations retire and renewable power generation, battery storage and consumer energy resources expand, the electricity system is becoming more distributed, connected and digitally managed.

The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) has issued its 2026 Integrated System Plan, which forecasts that by 2050 consumers in the National Electricity Market will have invested in 87 GW of rooftop and other small-scale solar and 35 GW of supporting batteries. It also expects 80 per cent of vehicles to be electric.

This is a major shift towards far more assets, digital platforms, remote connections and participants. That transition creates an identity security challenge that deserves the same attention as physical resilience and network capacity.

The energy sector has traditionally approached cyber risk by protecting networks, devices and operational technology (OT). Those controls remain essential, but attackers do not always need to exploit a technical vulnerability if they can simply log in using legitimate account credentials.

Australia's own threat data illustrates the problem

The Australian Signals Directorate's (ASD) Annual Cyber Threat Report 2024–25 found that compromised accounts or credentials were involved in 19 per cent of reported critical infrastructure incidents.

The ASD report showed that phishing was among the most common vulnerabilities leading to critical infrastructure incidents, appearing in 20 per cent of cases.

ASD also reported that in incidents where data was encrypted for impact, compromised credentials and legitimate external remote services were the most common methods of initial access by the bad actors.

Identity is now part of operational resilience

Energy technology environments depend on a growing range of users who may need access to sensitive systems, such as network engineers, plant operators, administrators, contractors, equipment vendors, field technicians and remote support teams.

Some of these hold privileged access that can change configurations or access critical systems. Others may connect for only a short project or maintenance window. In an interconnected IT and operational technology environment, a single compromised account can serve as a starting point for lateral movement.

Remote access increases the challenge

Renewable generation and battery assets are often geographically dispersed, while specialised vendors may support equipment remotely. Every access path has to answer three questions: who is connecting, whether they should have access and whether the organisation can trust the authentication method they are using.

Passwords can no longer provide that assurance. Nor should organisations assume that all multi-factor authentication (MFA) offers the same level of protection. SMS codes, one-time passwords and push notifications can still be intercepted or socially engineered through phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks. ASD has specifically warned that MFA methods that are not phishing-resistant can remain susceptible to compromise.

Phishing-resistant authentication changes that model. FIDO2-based authentication and hardware security keys, such as YubiKeys, use public-key cryptography and bind authentication to the legitimate service. There is no shared password or one-time code for an attacker to steal and use on a fraudulent site. ASD recommends phishing-resistant MFA, including FIDO2 security keys and passkeys, for privileged accounts and remote access.

Australia's regulation is moving in the same direction

Under the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act (SOCI) 2018, responsible entities for relevant critical infrastructure assets must maintain critical infrastructure risk management programs designed to identify and manage material hazards.

In June 2026, Australia strengthened the associated Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program rules. The enhanced requirements apply to asset classes including critical electricity assets, critical energy market operator assets, critical gas assets and critical liquid fuel assets.

Significantly, the rules now address "credential compromise hazards". Where the relevant framework does not itself require phishing-resistant MFA, affected entities must identify systems and networks that require phishing-resistant MFA, including access to internet-connected computers and critical systems; privileged and unprivileged access to critical components; and remote access to applications, systems, or services. The new rules also call for central logging, monitoring and review of failed MFA attempts.

There are transition periods attached to the new obligations, but the policy direction is clear: credential security is increasingly being treated as a critical infrastructure resilience issue.

AEMO's Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security Framework reinforces the point. Its guidance includes identity and access management as a core cybersecurity domain and addresses unnecessary access and privileged accounts.

Authentication must follow the risk

Energy organisations should start by identifying the entities that can create the greatest operational impact. For example, privileged administrators, engineers with access to control environments, remote operators, third-party vendors and contractors should be prioritised. These users should be protected with phishing-resistant MFA, with least-privilege access and strong lifecycle controls, ensuring permissions can be removed when roles, projects, or employment end.

Building a resilient energy system

Australia cannot build a resilient energy system while treating identity security as an afterthought. The transition to renewables, battery storage and distributed energy is creating a more connected operating environment, with more users, devices, contractors and remote access points interacting across critical systems.

That connectivity brings efficiency and flexibility, but it also expands the attack surface. If compromised credentials can give an attacker legitimate access to systems that help generate, store, manage, or distribute electricity, authentication becomes a resilience issue, not simply an IT control.

As Australia modernises its energy infrastructure, identity security needs to keep pace. Phishing-resistant authentication should be treated as part of the critical infrastructure foundation required to keep the power grid secure, reliable and operational. The energy transition cannot be considered resilient if the identities controlling it are not